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Abstract- Online payments in business-to-consumer electronic
commerce are mainly made with credit cards. Fraud and
chargebacks are a significant issue for merchants and payment
card brands, due to widespread use of unsecured or partially
secured credit card transactions. The Secure Electronic
Transaction (SET) protocol may not only provide a high security
level. It also enables productivity improvements and therefore the
reduction of transaction costs in payment processes. In the paper,
the costs and benefits of SET are evaluated. The results show that
security and efficiency are not sufficient to guarantee the market
penetration of SET. Additional incentives for merchants and even
more important for cardholders are necessary in order to gain
market share.
INTRODUCTION
There are a wide range of electronic payment systems for
online purchases [1-4]. In spite of impressing growth rates in
the past and audacious growth forecasts of business-to-
consumer E-Commerce [5], p. 30, only a very small part of the
transactions are made online. Surveys on supply [6, 7] of
payments for E-Commerce transactions show that mostly
traditional payment systems are used. Rumors tell us that online
payments are mainly made with credit cards1 followed far
behind by other electronic payments like electronic checks and
electronic bank transfers. Until now, digital or electronic cash
plays only a minor part. These payment habits are also reflected
by the internet fraud complaints and the used payment methods
reported to the National Fraud Information Center [11].
In this paper, we first show the barriers mentioned in several
surveys causing the low usage of online payments. Afterwards,
we analyze online credit card payments with respect to data
security and potential productivity improvements. The different
parties involved in the payment process are analyzed,  and the
results are presented. Concluding, we show the results of the
cost-benefit comparison for the introduction of Secure
Electronic Transaction (SET) and introduce an incentive driven
feedback control system.
What are the reasons frequently mentioned for the fact that
online purchases are paid online only to a very small extent?
THE BARRIERS TO ONLINE PAYMENTS
Several surveys [12-16] show missing data security and
missing privacy as the main causes for the small usage of
online payments.  Especially, the fear of possible fraud is a
very strong barrier against the use of online payments. Other
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 There are various statements about credit card use in online payments
ranging from 70 to 90 percent of consumer online sales, e.g. [8-10].
barriers with less importance are the need to see the product
before paying it and too complicate procedures for consumers
involved in electronic payment processes.  For merchants, not
widely used or available security methods, the difficult
integration of new E-Commerce products with existing systems
and the absence of convergence on E-Commerce standards are
mentioned.
The quoted barriers for supply and use of online payments
indicate that there is a lack of information and know-how. Both
consumers and merchants suffer from a lack of information
about fraud risk, existing payment systems and security of
transaction data, and from a lack of know-how implementing
and using the systems.
Moreover, the new developments in internet based payment
systems bring up new chances evoked by the employment of
efficient and effective payment systems to exploit the potential
productivity improvements. These are not limited to the
prevention of fraud, but extend to the automatic execution of
the whole procedures from the online payment to the automatic
settlement.
Let us now turn to the development of credit card payments
in respect of data security and potential productivity
improvements.
THE CURRENT STATE OF ONLINE CREDIT CARD PAYMENTS
Credit card payments have been the only online payments
internationally available for business-to-consumer transactions
by now. For the settlement of credit card transactions, the
involved parties use the already existing world-wide
infrastructure of the payment card brands. The international
character of credit card payments corresponds to the nature of
E-Commerce. This is an essential reason for the dominant
position of credit cards within online payments. Other online
payments, e.g. electronic cash, have been until now limited to
the issuer and play an inferior role.
Unsecured credit card transactions use electronic mail and
web forms to transmit data in plaintext from cardholder to
merchant. The weaknesses of these procedures lie in the
unsecured transmission through the open network and in the
possibly resulting attacks.
As a first remedy for secured transmission acts Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) [17] with web forms or the use of
encryption software with electronic mail, e.g. Pretty Good
Privacy (PGP) [18]. These methods offer encryption (and with
it security) on a session level. PGP additionally offers digital
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signatures. Once the data arrives at the merchant’s server, all
the information is decrypted and whether or not it is stored in a
secure way preventing unauthorized access depends on the
merchant.
Similar to MOTO transactions (mail order/telephone order),
both unsecured and partially secured (SSL, PGP) transactions
show a series of common problems:
• The cardholder looses control over her credit card
information and has to trust the merchant in guarding the
credit card information securely. The cardholder has no
assurance that the merchant is authorized to accept credit
card payment.
• The merchant has no assurance that the consumer is the
authorized cardholder of the credit card used for the
purchase. Moreover, he risks repudiation of the purchase
by the cardholder. This also applies to credit card data
transmission with PGP even if electronic signatures are
legally binding.2 The merchant is responsible himself for
authorization and clearing of the transactions.
In contrast to MOTO transactions, the data already exists in
electronic form with online transactions. Combined with the
data processing capabilities of information technology, the
damage caused by online fraud can be much higher than with
conventional fraud [19]. This also applies to credit card
transactions, even though the consequences of fraud are
unequally distributed among the involved parties as will be
shown later on.
How do fraud and chargeback with unsecured or partially
secured online credit card payments affect cardholders,
merchants, financial institutes and payment card brands?
FRAUD AND CHARGEBACKS
A. Fraud
Cardholders whose credit card information was fraudulently
used have monetary costs of retention and card blocking but
also opportunity costs for the time spent. A new credit card has
to be applied for and to be issued. Depending on payment card
brand or issuer, there can be solutions of goodwill so that the
opportunity costs for cardholders in most of the cases are
limited to the factor time.
Merchants have no costs if they are careful, i.e. the credit
card is not on the revocation list and the product is shipped to
the authorized address. If merchants are not careful and ship
their goods or services to an unauthorized address or accept
revoked credit cards, they have to bear the loss of the shipped
product. In contrast to cardholders, merchants cannot anticipate
goodwill from payment card brands.
Payment card brands, issuers and acquirers have to bear
administrative costs. Payment card brands additionally have to
cover the costs of the product shipped by a careful merchant.
The lost disagio reduces their earnings.
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 As one anonymous reviewer pointed out, electronic signatures may
be legally binding in a number of countries based on a contractual
relationship but the emerging laws on electronic signatures do not
pertain to the credit card applications.
B. Chargebacks
In case of transactions where the cardholder denies the
purchase of the good or service the cardholder has to make a
statutory declaration testifying that the purchase has not been
executed by her. In order to be able to detect a purchase not
executed, the cardholder has to regularly check her credit card
balance. The costs of the cardholder are time, not money. With
repeating chargebacks the cardholder will apply for a new card.
It is also possible that the issuer will suggest a new card,
because there obviously is some kind of fraud. The costs for the
cardholder in this case corresponds to the fraud costs described
above.
Merchants have to cover the acquirer’s fee for the
chargeback (normally divided into administrative fee and loss
fee) in addition to the loss of the product. They can, of course,
sue the cardholder for reimbursement of the costs.
Provided that the merchant’s administrative fee covers the
acquirer’s and payment card brand’s administrative costs, no
costs remain with them. However, the lost disagio reduces the
earnings of the payment card brand.
Experiences of Visa concerning fraud and chargebacks show
that there are big differences depending on areas. Visa’s U.S.
E-Commerce sales volume remains under one percent. The
share of fraud and chargebacks coming from E-Commerce
transactions also remains under one percent. In contrast to the
U.S., the share of fraud and chargebacks coming from E-
Commerce transactions in Asia is at approximately 50 percent,
although only two percent of Visa Asia-Pacific's credit card
business comes from E-Commerce [20].
Experiences of merchants show that without authorization of
credit card payments high fraud rates on the merchant’s
account can be dangerous for the merchant’s existence [21].
There are procedures solving this problem, e.g. fraud detection
software and off-line verification via fax or phone. More
sophisticated systems perform real-time authorization requests
and clearing through the internet and automatic settlement
using financial networks, e.g. Open Market3, First E-
Commerce4 or Brokat5. After all, the problem of non-
repudiation and therefore chargebacks still remains a big issue.
How can SET solve problems caused by unsecured or
partially secured online payments?
SECURITY AND PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENTS THROUGH SET
The SET specification describes a public-key infrastructure
and protocol definitions at the application layer, which can be
used to make secure electronic payments with credit cards over
open, insecure networks like the internet. The fundamental
steps of  SET transactions are described in [22] pp. 55-72.
Given that all parties of a transaction are certified, the SET
protocol aims to provide the confidentiality of the transmitted
data, the authentication of the involved parties, the ability of the
cardholder to pay and the non-repudiation of the transaction.
This leads to the following improvements:
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 http://www.openmarket.com/
4
 http://www.firstecom.com/
5
 http://www.brokat.de/
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Fig. 1. Chain of trust from cardholder to merchant through SET Public Key Infrastructure [23], p. 115
• The use of digital certificates ensures for both merchants
and cardholders that their counterparts are authorized
cardholders or merchants. This is only true under the
assumption that cardholders and merchants keep their
private key safe.
• The concept of dual signatures separates Order Instruction
(OI) and Payment Instruction (PI). The data is transmitted
by the cardholder in two parts within one packet, the OI
visible only for the merchant, the PI visible only for the
payment gateway.
• The automated authorization of payments guarantees that
the merchant gets the money for the sold goods.
• The clearing of payments is also automated over the
internet. No additional infrastructure is necessary.
• No external collection of data is necessary during the
whole process. The data of cardholder and credit card
comes from the Consumer Wallet, the data of the product
comes from the Merchant Server. Authorization and
clearing are processed through the internet. Settlement is
processed through financial networks. This way, printouts,
mailings, telephone calls and recollection of data become
superfluous, at least to a certain extent.
Despite the separation of OI and PI using dual signatures,
merchants authorized by the acquirer may receive the card
number. This depends on the boolean MerAuthFlag of the
MerchantData private extension whose default value is TRUE
[23], pp. 234f.. As this seems to be true with most merchants
[24], the cardholder looses control over his credit card number
in the same way as with insecure or partially secure methods.
Unlike with these methods, there is the certification of the
merchants within SET. As can be seen in Fig. 1, a chain of trust
from cardholder to merchant can be established with the
adequate certification policy.
For cardholders, this is only a second best solution and
inferior to the invisibility of the credit card number for
merchants.
What are the costs and benefits for cardholders, merchants
and payment card brands for implementation and use of secure
systems?
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF MIGRATING TO SET
Since cardholders have no or low monetary costs, as stated
earlier, the main benefits of using SET accrue from a higher
security level. This may result in additional time due to
avoidance of fraudulent use of credit card data.6 On the other
hand the costs of using SET depend on cardholders’
information technology know-how and the price of the
certificate and the wallet, if there is any. One can also imagine,
that installation and update of the wallet and the certificate
management are time consuming activities for the cardholder.
Therefore, the magnitude of the benefits of SET, measured
mainly in time, are highly dependent on the future
inconvenience through fraud to each cardholder. The risks of
the cardholder are small due to established procedures for
resolving fraud and the right to dispute charges. The data
published by the Internet Fraud Watch shows that credit cards
only make up 8% of all fraudulent transactions reported [25].
Unless people are risk avers or already had a lot of trouble
without secure systems, they might not be willing to switch to
SET because in general costs will exceed benefits.
For merchants, the costs of system implementation, i.e.
merchant server, merchant certificate, the integration with
existing systems and the training of the staff, have to be inferior
to the reduction of losses invoked by fraud and chargebacks,
and the benefits from rationalization by the automation of
                                                          
6
 If one assumes that SET will be successfully attacked once in
widespread use, things change. Cardholders will not be able to dispute
charges as easily as without SET and the benefits diminish.
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Fig. 2. Incentive driven feedback control system
authorization and payment settlement. This mainly depends on
the actual or expected number of transactions and on the
expected fraudulent transactions and chargebacks.
For payment card brands, the costs of implementation, i.e.
the payment gateway, the integration with existing systems and
the implementation and maintenance of the certification
infrastructure, have to be inferior to the reduction of fraud
losses, the benefits from rationalization by the automation of
authorization and payment settlement, and the additional
disagio from the expected rise of turnover induced by stronger
trust of cardholders in the secure system.
FEEDBACK CONTROL SYSTEM
Payment card brands benefit from the implementation of a
secure system like SET which aims to provide confidentiality,
authentication of the involved parties, ability to pay by the
cardholder and non-repudiation of transactions.
The benefit for merchants mainly depends on the kind of
goods and services sold, on the way they authorize card
payments and the volume of transactions which essentially
influences the potential of rationalization.
Cardholders on the other hand hardly have any monetary
costs from fraud or chargebacks, as shown earlier in FRAUD
AND CHARGEBACKS. If cardholders are risk avers and data
security is an issue, they will use SET provided that they have
or are willing to learn the adequate know-how and trust the
system. The combination of these assumptions will hardly be
found among cardholders, especially because of simple
widespread alternatives.
From this follows that payment card brands and financial
institutes have to set further steps and measures. Security alone
may not be sufficient for cardholders and merchants, neither
perceived productivity improvements through SET for
merchants. After all, expectations play an important role. If
merchants expect E-Commerce and, through this, their own
growth rates to rise, they will be more willing to adapt secure
systems due to possibly rising fraud and chargebacks.
From the above one can also state that the supply of SET
payments increases or decreases according to the expectations
of merchants concerning the future development of E-
Commerce and their own derived growth. The variations of the
supply affect the number and the volume of E-Commerce
transactions executed by cardholders. The demand on SET
transactions in turn influences the expectations in the growth of
E-Commerce. This leads to a feedback control system (see Fig.
2) which influences E-Commerce growth positively or
negatively according to the starting position. Payment card
brands act on this feedback control system – on the
cardholders’ as well as on the merchants’ side – by giving
positive or negative incentives for using SET or other sorts of
internet-based credit card payments. The design of efficient and
effective incentives still remains to be done.
CONCLUSIONS
The role of SET in future E-Commerce remains uncertain,
although the biggest payment card brands back this open
standard. Furthermore, there are already several software
companies providing solutions which implement the SET
protocol, e.g. IBM, Microsoft, Brokat CyberCash, VeriFone
and others [26]. The Secure Electronic Transaction (SET)
protocol does not only provide a high security level but also
enables productivity improvements and therefore the reduction
of transaction costs in payment processes. However, this is not
sufficient. The analysis of costs and benefits showed that
additional incentives for merchants and, above all, for
cardholders are necessary to promote the diffusion and use of
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SET. Expectations are essential in this process, whereby
positive externalities for E-Commerce could arise.
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